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CASE NOTE:
A WOMAN'S LIFE, A WOMAN'S HEALTH:
EQUALIZING MEDICAID ABORTION FUNDING
IN SIMA T CORP. v. ARIZONA HEALTH CARE
COST CONTAINMENT SYSTEM
Sara G. Gordon
I. INTRODUCTION
In late summer of 1999, a group of Arizona physicians challenged an
Arizona statute restricting Medicaid funding for abortions sought by indigent
women.' Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System ("AHCCCS")
administers Medicaid claims in Arizona and provides services to Medicaid-eligible
recipients with incomes at or below 140% of the federal poverty level.
2 The
plaintiff-doctors provided services, including abortions, to AHCCCS patients and
had other patients who were suffering from illnesses that were serious, though not
immediately life-threatening. Medical treatment for many of these conditions
requires that pregnant patients first undergo an abortion, as the treatment could be
damaging or fatal to the fetus. 4 In many cases, postponement of therapy during
1. Simat Corp. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys., No. CV 99-014614
(Ariz. Super. Ct. 1999) (minute entry).
2. Simat Corp. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys., 56 P.3d 28, 29
(Ariz. 2002). For the fiscal year 2003, this income threshold is the equivalent of $25,760
annually for a family of four. See CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICAID
ELIGIBILITY POLICY, 2003 FEDERAL POVERTY GUIDELINES, available at http://www.
cms.hhs.gov/medicaid/eligibility/pov0 I 03.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2003).
3. Simat, 56 P.3d at 29.
4. Id. The most common example of this type of condition is cancer, for which
the standard treatment of chemo or radiation therapy cannot be administered to a pregnant
woman. Other examples for which treatment must be suspended during pregnancy include
heart disease, diabetes, kidney disease, liver disease, chronic renal failure, asthma, sickle
cell anemia, Marfan's syndrome, arthritis, inflammatory bowel disease, gall bladder disease,
severe mental illness, hypertension, uterine fibroid tumors, epilepsy, toxemia, and lupus. Id.
at 29-30.
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pregnancy can have serious repercussions for pregnant women, including adverse
health effects and decreased life expectancy.
5
In allocating funds for abortion services, AHCCCS followed a statutory
prohibition on payment of abortion services unless "necessary to save the life of
the woman having the abortion," 6 but also provided services for victims of rape or
incest as a condition necessary to receive federal reimbursement under Medicaid.7
AHCCCS did not provide abortions to indigent women whose health, but not life,
was threatened by pregnancy.8
In a decision deviating from those of the United States Supreme Court,
the Arizona Supreme Court declared the Arizona statute and accompanying
AHCCCS provisions unconstitutional because they did not survive a strict scrutiny
analysis under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Arizona Constitution.
9
Where the state of Arizona has undertaken to fund abortions for indigent women
whose lives are directly threatened by pregnancy, it cannot refuse to pay for
abortions for similarly indigent women whose health, but not life, is threatened.'o
II. FEDERAL LAW
A. A Brief History: Medicaid and the Hyde Amendment
Popularly known as Medicaid, Title XIX of the Social Security Act was
created in 1965 to provide federal grants to states that furnish medical assistance to
those who cannot afford necessary medical services.'' Each state's Medicaid
program must comply with the federal mandates and requirements specified in
Title XIX.12 Although the federal government issues general guidelines, states
5. Id. at 30.
6. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 35-196.02 (1980) (declared unconstitutional by Simat, 56
P.3d 28).
7. Simat, 56 P.3d at 30. Medicaid apportions federal funds to states to provide
abortions when the pregnancy constitutes a direct threat to the life of the mother, but not
when the pregnant woman's health is jeopardized by the pregnancy. Funds are also
available when the pregnancy is a result of rape or incest. See Hyde Amendment, Pub. L.
No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923 (1979); 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2003). Under federal law,
Arizona was not required to fund abortions other than those for which federal
reimbursement was available, and the state accordingly funded only those abortions
required to maintain compliance with Medicaid statutes and regulations. Simat, 56 P.3d at
30; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 309-10 (1980).
8. Simat, 56 P.3d at 30.
9. ARIZ. CONST. art 11, § 13. Arizona has historically followed the United States
Supreme Court's equal protection analysis when analyzing privileges and immunities
claims under the Arizona Constitution. See Valley Nat'l Bank v. Glover, 159 P.2d 292, 299
(Ariz. 1945); Martin v. Reinstein, 987 P.2d 779, 799 (Ariz. App. 1999).
10. Simat, 56 P.3d at 32.
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396; see also Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Serv.,
Medicaid: A Brief Summary, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/publications/overview-
medicare-medicaid/default4.asp (last visited Sept. 28, 2003). To be eligible for Medicaid
assistance, recipients must fall well below the federal poverty level; the precise income-
eligibility threshold is determined by individual states. Id
12. See Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 11.
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establish their own requirements for Medicaid participation,13 thus retaining the
flexibility to adopt provisions based on individual economic resources, political
and social climates, and state constitutions.
Congress initially restricted Medicaid funding for abortions when it
enacted the Hyde Amendment in September 1976.14 Named after its original
congressional sponsor, Representative Henry Hyde, the amendment severely limits
the use of federal funds to reimburse states for the cost of abortions under
Medicaid. 15 The amendment contains a few narrow exceptions to the general ban
on federal abortion funding, which have varied over the years.' 6 In its current
form, the Hyde Amendment authorizes federal funding of abortions when a
pregnant woman's life is endangered by the pregnancy, or when a pregnancy
results from a reported rape or incest.' 7 Federal funding is not available when
abortion is recommended for the treatment of other medical conditions where the
woman's health, but not her life, is put at risk by carrying the fetus to term.' 8 The
Supreme Court has consistently upheld the constitutionality of Hyde Amendment
restrictions on federal abortion funding and removed the obligation of states to
subsidize abortions when federal funding is unavailable.' 9
B. Maher & Harris: Equal Protection Analysis of State Statutes Limiting
Medicaid Funding for Abortions
In two major cases involving the constitutionality of the Hyde
Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has applied an equal protection
analysis to state statutes that limit a Medicaid recipient's access to funding for
13. Id.
14. Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418 (1976); see also
Larry P. Boyd, Comment, The Hyde Amendment: New Implications for Equal Protection
Claims, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 295, 295 (1981).
15. Boyd, supra note 14, at 295.
16. Id.
17. Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923 (1979); see also
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301(1980).
18. The majority of states have followed the federal government's lead in
restricting public funding for abortion. Thirty-two states pay for abortions for indigent
women whose lives are endangered by the pregnancy, as well as in cases of rape or incest,
as mandated by federal Medicaid law and the Hyde Amendment. (A few of these states also
pay in cases of fetal impairment or when the pregnancy threatens "severe" health problems,
but none provide reimbursement for all medically necessary abortions for indigent women.)
Currently, only seventeen states fund abortions for indigent women on the same terms as
other pregnancy-related and general health services. Three of these states provide funding
voluntarily (Hawaii, New York, and Washington); in fourteen states, courts have interpreted
their state constitutions to give broader protection for reproductive choice than the United
States Constitution and have ordered nondiscriminatory public funding of abortions
(Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Vermont, and West Virginia). Finally, one
state (South Dakota) fails to comply with the Hyde Amendment, instead providing coverage
only when necessary for lifesaving abortions. See AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, PUBLIC
FUNDING FOR ABORTION (Jan. 15, 2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/Reproductive
Rights/ReproductiveRights.cfin?lD=9039&c=1 46.
19. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris, 448 U.S. 297.
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abortions.20 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that no state may "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection ofte ,,21
the laws, a mandate interpreted to require that state governments treat all
similarly situated persons alike.22 Citizens need not be treated identically, however,
and perfect equality is not required. The level ofjudicial scrutiny applied to equal
protection challenges varies based on the nature of the classifications or rights
involved. If a classification does not involve a suspect class or fundamental right,
it is examined under the relatively lenient rational basis standard, and such
legislation will be upheld provided it is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.24 When the implicated right is considered fundamental or the affected
class is suspect, however, courts will apply a strict scrutiny analysis and the
discriminatory legislation will be upheld only if it serves a compelling state
interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.
25
In Maher v. Roe, decided one year after passage of the Hyde
Amendment,26 the Court upheld a Connecticut statute denying funds for abortions
for indigent women except when medically necessary.27 The Plaintiff claimed an
equal protection violation, arguing that abortion and childbirth should be treated
equally.2 8 After noting that indigence is not a suspect classification,29 the Court
explained that Roe v. Wade did not establish a fundamental constitutional right to
abortion.30 Instead, the right at stake was that of a pregnant woman to make a
choice free from "unduly burdensome interference" by the government. 31 The
Court rejected the argument that the statute placed obstacles in the path of an
20. Maher, 432 U.S. 464; Harris, 448 U.S. 297.
21. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
22. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
23. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1974).
24. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. The fundamental rights that give rise to a
strict scrutiny analysis include marriage and procreation, voting, certain aspects of criminal
procedure, many First Amendment rights, and the right to travel. See 16B C.J.S.
Constitutional Law § 714 (1985). A suspect class is one with a history of unequal treatment,
in a position of political powerlessness or having immutable characteristics that result in
stigma or inferiority. Id. Suspect classifications include race, national origin and alienage.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1460 (7th ed. 1999).
25. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1982). The intermediate scrutiny test,
which applies to so called "quasi-suspect classifications," does not apply to the
classifications at issue in this case and was not discussed by any of the various courts.
26. The version of the Hyde Amendment at issue in Maher prohibited the use of
federal funds for abortion except in three circumstances: when the life of the mother would
be endangered by carrying the fetus to term; a full term pregnancy would result in severe
and long-lasting damage to the mother's physical health, as certified by two physicians; or
the mother was a victim of incest or rape, but only if the incest or rape had been promptly
reported to law enforcement or public health officials. See Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. 94-
439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418 (1976); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); see also Boyd, supra
note 14, at 295.
27. Maher, 432 U.S. at 474.
28. Id. at 470.
29. Id. at 470-71.
30. Id. at 473-74.
31. Id.
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indigent woman's exercise of her right to choose abortion, finding that the
financial constraints that prevent a woman from exercising her choice are instead a
product of her indigency 2 Because a fundamental right was not involved, the
statute passed rational basis muster. The state's legitimate interest in protecting the
life of the fetus was "rationally further[ed]" by Connecticut's decision to subsidize
only medical expenses incident to childbirth.33
A few years later, the Court reconsidered the abortion funding issue in
Harris v. McRae.
34 Though the effective version of the Hyde Amendment was
substantially more restrictive than the version in force when Maher was decided,35
the Court again found no infringement upon a fundamental right,36 nor impact on a
suspect class.37 As concluded in Maher, the government's legitimate interest in
protecting potential life was rationally related to the Hyde Amendment's decision
to withhold funding for almost all abortions.
38
III. THE ARIZONA SUPREME COURT
While decisions of the United States Supreme Court carry great weight in
guiding the interpretation of state constitutional provisions that correspond to
federal provisions, Arizona courts are not required to "blindly follow federal
precedent. ' 39 Consequently, the Arizona doctors urged the superior court to
disregard the precedent set forth in Harris and grant relief notwithstanding this
backdrop of unfavorable federal law. The doctors' initial complaint sought
declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that AHCCCS's funding policy
violated various provisions of the Arizona Constitution, including the privacy
clause, the due process clause, and the equal privileges and immunities clause.4"
The superior court granted the doctors' motion for summary judgment and ordered
AHCCCS to fund abortions that were medically necessary to the same extent it
funded other abortion services.4" The court identified the right involved as one of
privacy, a fundamental right under the Arizona Constitution, and found that the
statute did not survive a strict scrutiny analysis.
42
32. Id. at 474.
33. Id. at 478-79.
34. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
35. Id.; see also Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923
(1979). Specifically, the Hyde Amendment in Harris excluded the prior language
authorizing Medicaid funds when the health of the pregnant woman would be jeopardized
by a full-term pregnancy. Harris, 448 U.S. at 302-03. Therefore, federal reimbursement for
abortions through the Medicaid program was available to a state only when the abortion was
required to save the mother's life or when the woman was a victim of a reported rape or
incest. Id.
36. Harris, 448 U.S. at 301.
37. Id. at 322-23.
38. Id. at 324.
39. Pool v. Super. Ct., 677 P.2d 261, 271 (Ariz. 1984).
40. Simat Corp. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys., 56 P.3d 28, 30
(Ariz. 2002); ARiz. CONST. art. II, §§ 4, 8, 13.
41. Simat, 56 P.3d at 30.
42. Id.
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Relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Harris, the
Arizona Court of Appeals, Division 1, reversed the superior court's decision on
both the right to privacy and equal protection issues.43 The court first declined to
find that the Arizona Constitution affords a greater right to privacy in abortion
matters than the United States Constitution." The equal protection analysis also
tracked the holding of the Supreme Court in Harris: The statute was not predicated
on a constitutionally suspect classification (the relevant classification was not sex,
but indigency), nor did it restrict a fundamental right (the amendment did not
impinge on the fundamental right to choose abortion, just upon the right to have
the government finance that choice).45 Under the less rigorous rational basis
review, the Arizona statute was rationally related to a legitimate governmental
purpose, namely the state's interest in promoting childbirth and protecting unborn
life.
46
In an opinion authored by Justice Feldman, the Arizona Supreme Court
rejected the court of appeals' reasoning and found that the holding in Harris was
not dispositive of the issue under the Arizona Constitution.4 7 While noting that the
Arizona Constitution, unlike the United States Constitution, provides an explicit
right of privacy to its citizens," the court did not analyze the case in terms of a
right to privacy. 9 The court instead approached the issue under the equal
privileges and immunities clause of the Arizona Constitution and applied the equal
protection analysis used by the United States Supreme Court.50
The Arizona statute discriminated between two classes of women: "those
who require recognized and necessary medical treatment to save their lives and
those who require such treatment to save their health and perhaps eventually their
lives." 51 Unlike the United States Supreme Court, the Arizona Supreme Court
found that the statute had not simply "made childbirth a more attractive alternative,
thereby influencing the woman's decision," but had in fact impinged upon the
fundamental right to choose abortion recognized in Roe v. Wade.52 Because the
right identified was fundamental, the court applied strict scrutiny and determined
43. Simat Corp. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys., 29 P.3d 281, 287
(Ariz. App. 2001).
44. Id. at 285.
45. Id. at 284.
46. Id. at 286-87.
47. Simat, 56 P.3d at 3 1.
48. Interestingly, the court included a "disclaimer" toward the end of the
opinion, noting, "Our decision is entirely based on the Arizona Constitution and Arizona
cases interpreting the relevant provisions of that constitution. Federal cases are cited only
for illustrative or comparative purposes and have not been relied on in reaching our
conclusions." Id. at 37.
49. The court specifically noted that Arizona's right of privacy does not entitle
citizens to subsidized abortions. Id. at 32.
50. Id.; see also ARIZ. CONST. art 11, § 13.
51. Sinmat, 56 P.3d at 32.
52. Id. at 33; see also Siniat, 29 P.3d at 286 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464, 474 (1977)).
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that the Arizona statute could only be upheld "if it serve[d] a compelling state
interest and [was] narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. 53
The Arizona Supreme Court recognized the state's legitimate interest in
preserving and protecting potential life and promoting childbirth. The court found
the lower court's decision misguided, however, because it had applied the wrong
standard of review, namely the rational basis test. The Arizona statute did not
survive strict scrutiny because the state's proffered interest was no more
compelling than its interest in protecting the health of the pregnant woman herself.
"Promoting childbirth is a legitimate state interest, but it seems almost inarguable
that promoting and actually saving the health and perhaps eventually the life of a
mother is at least as compelling a state interest. 54
The court bolstered its opinion by citing several United States Supreme
Court cases decided subsequent to Harris wherein state restrictions on abortions
gave way to the more compelling state interest of protecting and preserving the
health of pregnant women.55 By withholding funding for abortions to indigent
women whose health is at risk, the state may be promoting childbirth and
protecting the fetus, but often it is endangering the health and perhaps eventually
the life of the pregnant woman.16 The state is not merely influencing a woman's
decision by making childbirth a more attractive option. Rather, it is "actually
conferring the privilege of [medical] treatment on one class and withholding it
from another.,
5 7
The state might have had a better case if it chose to withhold funding for
all abortions.5 8 Once the state has undertaken to provide medically necessary
health care for indigent women, however, it must do so in a neutral manner.59 The
state's interest in promoting childbirth and protecting the fetus is not sufficiently
compelling to justify its refusal to protect the health of a seriously ill pregnant
woman. 60 The justification for this disparate treatment becomes even less
persuasive given the law's allowance for funding for the abortion of a healthy fetus
that results from rape or incest, even where the mother's life or health would not
be endangered by carrying the fetus to term. 6' The Arizona statute and related
AHCCCS provisions failed strict scrutiny analysis and violated the privileges and
immunities clause of the Arizona Constitution.62
53. Sinat, 56 P.3d at 33.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 34 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992);
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 32, 34.
60. Id. at 34.
61. Id.
62. Id.; see also ARIZ. CoNsT. art II. § 13. This decision is in accord with the
majority of states that have examined similar funding restrictions. See Simat, 56 P.3d at 35-
36. The opinion outlined several cases wherein courts have concluded that their state
constitutions offer broader protection than the United States Constitution and have held that
once the state has undertaken to provide medically necessary care related to childbirth, they
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Hyde Amendment disallows federal Medicaid reimbursement to
states for abortions that are necessary to protect the health, but not the life, of a
pregnant indigent woman. The Arizona Supreme Court's decision in Simat means
that, notwithstanding the unavailability of federal reimbursement, once the state
undertakes to provide abortions for indigent women where necessary to save their
lives, it must provide such health care in a neutral manner and also provide
abortions when necessary to protect and preserve the health of these women. The
state will therefore be required to finance the procedures with its own funds.
The decision was a major victory for abortion rights advocates and critics
of the Hyde Amendment, who claimed that the law as it stood before Simat often
presented pregnant, indigent women with a string of bleak options: carry the
pregnancy to term and face possibly serious health consequences; attempt to
procure an abortion through less expensive and more dangerous sources; 63 or use
their own limited funds to finance the abortion, often at the expense of other
children or necessary living expenses. 64 Others claim that the Hyde Amendment is
a back-door attempt by Congress to limit abortions generally and to deny poor
women the protections espoused in Roe v. Wade.65
Critics of the decision, including the dissenting justices, argue that the
Simat decision is actually a means of judicial legislating; the state is being forced
to spend money beyond that which the legislature authorized.66 Moreover, Arizona
courts had previously followed the equal protection analysis employed by the
Supreme Court, and the Court's analysis in Maher and Harris appeared dispositive
of the issue: While a state cannot interfere with a woman's right to choose an
abortion, it is under no obligation to fund that choice.
67
must also fund medically necessary abortions for indigent women. Id. (citing Doe v.
Gomez, 542 N.W.2d 17, 28 (Minn. 1995); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 935
(N.J. 1982); Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 150 (Conn. 1986); State v. Planned Parenthood of
Alaska, Inc., 28 P.3d 904, 913 (Alaska 2001); Moe v. Sec'y of Admin. and Fin., 417 N.E.2d
387, 402 (Mass. 1981); Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 798 (Cal.
1981)).
63. In the first year the Hyde Amendment was in effect, an estimated 2,000
Medicaid-eligible pregnant women turned to illegal abortion. Willard Cates, Jr., The Hyde
Amendment in Action: How Did the Restriction of Federal Funds for Abortion Affect Low-
Income Women?, 246 JAMA 1109, 1111 (1981).
64. One study showed that 44% of women on Medicaid who obtained abortions
in 1982 paid for them wholly or partly with money designated for living expenses. Stanley
K. Henshaw & Lynn S. Wallisch, The Medicaid Cutoff and Abortion Servicesfor the Poor,
16 FAMILY PLANNING PERSPECTIVES 170, 178-79 (1984).
65. See, e.g., Sandra Berenknopf, Comment, Judicial and Congressional Back-
Door Methods that Limit the Effect of Roe v. Wade: There Is No Choice if There Is No
Access, 70 TEMP. L. REv 653 (1997).
66. See Simat, 56 P.3d at 40-41 (Berch, J., dissenting); see also Robert Robb,
Court's Abortion 'Remedy' Is Legislating from Bench, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Oct. 30, 2002, at
BlI.
67. Simat, 56 P.3d at 38; see also Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
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The dissenting opinion by Justice Berch suggested that the decision in
Simat had in essence created a new fundamental right to neutral funding.
68 If this
right to funding is fundamental-which the majority denies-a path may have
been laid by which future plaintiffs could challenge on equal protection grounds
any government program that provides disparate health care benefits. Do indigent
patients have a fundamental right to have all necessary medical treatment
subsidized by the state, or is the right to equal funding specific to abortion? As the
Simat decision notes, the privacy clause of the Arizona Constitution has been
found to confer a fundamental right to choose or refuse medical treatment.
69 Thus,
while the majority claims that its decision is to be construed narrowly and will not
require AHCCCS to provide "greatly expanded medical care" to its recipients,
70
the decision does provide a potential framework for new challenges to
government-subsidized health care in Arizona.
68. Sinmat, 56 P.3d at 41 n.4.
69. Id at 32 (citing Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 682 (Ariz. 1987)).
70. Id. at 37.
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